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A Remedy For Rule 238
Lawrence M. Lebowitz*
I. INTRODUCTION
Is the United States undergoing a "litigation explosion?" Many
commentators' have recently answered this question in the affir-
mative, and the statistics appear to support their conclusion. For
example, from 1967 to 1976 appellate filings in state courts increased
eight times as fast as the population, while state trial court filings
increased at double the rate of population growth. 2 A similar growth
pattern has occurred in the federal courts, where civil filings in
district courts have increased from approximately 35,000 in 1940 to
nearly 200,000 in 1984.1 The work load of the courts of appeals
has risen even more dramatically. In the year ending June 30, 1982,
27,946 cases were filed in those courts-an increase of 6% over the
record established in 1981, over 46% more than in 1977, and an
* B.A., 1984, University of Pennsylvania; J.D., 1987, University of Pitts-
burgh. Mr. Lebowitz is an Associate with the law firm of Alder Cohen & Grigsby,
P.C. in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The author wishes to thank both Professor
Arthur Chaykin and Dean Mark Nordenberg of the University of Pittsburgh
School of Law for their much appreciated assistance in the preparation of this
article.
1. See, e.g., Barton, Behind the Legal Explosion, 27 STAN. L. REv. 567
(1975); Glazer, Towards an Imperial Judiciary?, 41 PUB. INTEREST 104, 105 (1975);
Manning, Hyperlexis: Our National Disease, 71 Nw. U.L. Ruv. 767, 767-770
(1977); Silberman, Will Lawyering Strangle Democratic Capitalism?, Regulation,
March-April 1978, at 15, 19; Tribe, Too Much Law, Too Little Justice: An
Argument for Delegalizing America, Atlantic, July, 1979, at 25. Some authors,
on the other hand, argue that this country is not experiencing a "litigation
explosion". See, e.g., Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We
Know and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious
and Litigious Society, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 4 (1983) ("the view that Americans
are unusually litigious is based more on myth than careful analysis of the data.");
Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer, & Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation,
31 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 72 (1983).
2. Burger, Isn't There A Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 275 (1982).
3. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1981 An-
nual Report of the Director 56, 94. [hereinafter 1981 Report]; See generally, Clark,
Adjudication to Administration: A Statistical Analysis of Federal District Courts
in the Twentieth Century, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 65, 89-90 (1981).
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astounding jump of almost 488% over the number of appeals filed
in 1962 .4 While the number of circuit and district judgeships has
also increased, they have not kept pace with the surge in filings,
thereby causing a substantial increase in the work load of federal
judges.' The future presents an even more drastic picture. One
commentator has predicted that a federal appellate judiciary con-
sisting of five thousand judges will produce over one thousand
volumes of federal reports in the course of disposing of more than
one million appeals per year by early in the twenty-first century.
6
Besides a growing fear that these numbers are getting out of
hand, there is also concern about the adverse effects which this
"explosion" will have on the administration of justice. In his article
entitled "The Rising Work Load and Perceived 'Bureaucracy' of
the Federal Courts: A Causation-Based Approach to the Search for
Appropriate Remedies," Judge Harry T. Edwards of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia points out
that:
What most consumers and suppliers (of legal services) presumably
share is a desire that legalization and the concomitant burdens that
it imposes on the federal courts not diminish those courts' ability to
perform three basic functions-protecting individual rights, inter-
preting and enforcing federal law, and ensuring the vitality of dem-
ocratic process of government.7
According to Judge Edwards, there are two major reasons why this
distressing scenario may result. First, burgeoning caseloads may
force courts to create judicial procedures designed to speed cases
through the system; quantity could replace quality as the trademark
of the judiciary as courts are inevitably transformed from "delib-
erative institutions" to "bureaucratic assembly lines." 8 Moreover,
these same pressures could have an adverse effect on the individual
4. These percentages are derived from 1981 Report, supra note 3, at 45;
See generally, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINIS-
TRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 124-128 (Fed. Jud.
Center 1984).
5. See 1981 Report, supra note 3, at 45.
6. Barton, Behind the Legal Explosion, 27 STAN. L. REv. 567, 567 (1975).
For a criticism of this bleak scenario, see Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing,
reprinted in The Pound Conference: Perspectives on Justice in the Future 65, 65-
66 (A. Levin & R. Wheeler eds. 1979).
7. Edwards, The Rising Work Load and Perceived Bureaucracy of the
Federal Courts: A Causation-Based Approach to the Search for Appropriate
Remedies, 68 IowA L. REv. 871, 874-75 (1983).
8. Id. at 878.
[Vol. 26:531
RULE 238
judges by changing their role in the system from a "collegial arbiter
and solitary craftsman" to "the judicial equivalent of the managing
partner in a small law firm." 9 These changes, which present a
radical departure from the traditional judicial model, indicate "a
crisis of overload that threatens the integrity of the courts and the
quality of justice."' 0
A notable adherent to this pessimistic outlook is Warren E.
Burger, former Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
In his annual report on the state of the judiciary, given to delegates
of the American Bar Association in June of 1982, Chief Justice
Burger cited statistics to prove the existence of a "litigation
explosion"" in our nation, and urged his audience to find alter-
natives to litigation in an attempt to end this crisis. The former
Chief Justice strongly argued that "there must be a better way,'
' 2
and in so doing echoed sentiments expressed by Abraham Lincoln
over a century ago: "Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors
to compromise whenever you can. Point out to them how the
nominal winner is often a real loser-in fees, expenses, and waste
of time.'" 3
Justice Burger concluded his address by warning that a movement
away from litigation is not only needed to end the current crisis
and alleviate the accompanying fears, but simply must take place
if attorneys are to continue performing their traditional role in
society:
The obligation of our profession is, or has been thought to be, to
serve as healers of human conflicts. To fulfill our traditional obli-
gation means that we should provide mechanisms that can produce
an acceptable result in the shortest possible time, with the least
possible expense, and with a minimum of stress on the participants.
That is what justice is all about. The law is a tool, not an end in
itself. Like any tool, particular judicial mechanisms, procedures, or
rules can become obsolete. Just as the carpenter's handsaw was
replaced with the power saw and his hammer was replaced by the
9. Id.
10. Id. at 877. See, e.g., Bork, Dealing With the Overload in Article III
Courts, reprinted in, The Pound Conference: Perspectives on Justice in the Future
150, 151-52 (A. Levin & R. Wheeler eds. 1979); Clark, A Commentary on
Congestion in the Federal Courts, 8 ST. MARY's L.J. 407, 407 (1976); McCree,
Bureaucratic Justice: An Early Warning, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 777, 781-82 (1982).




DUQUESNE LA W REVIEW
stapler, we should be alert to the need for better tools to serve our
purposes. 
1 4
In September of 1978, the Pennsylvania Civil Procedure Rules
Committee responded to these calls for reform by proposing Rule
238 to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania for its review and
promulgation. In its accompanying explanatory comments, the Com-
mittee expressed many of the same concerns that have surfaced in
recent articles on the "litigation explosion":
The judicial system has long been vexed by the problem of congestion
and delay in the disposition of civil actions for bodily injury, death
or property damages pending in the trial court 5 .... Statistics show
that... thirty-eight percent are settled without going to trial. Some
are settled through pretrial conciliation techniques, but in too many
cases meaningful negotiations commence only after a trial date is
fixed or on the courthouse steps or in the courtroom, thus leading
to delay in the disposition of cases and congestion in the courts. The
present practice provides no incentive for early settlement.
6
As a result, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, pursuant to its
constitutional authority, 7 promulgated PA. R. Crv. P. 23818 on
14. Id. at 274.
15. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
16. 8 Pa. Admin. Bull. 2668 (1978).
17. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is empowered to "prescribe general
rules governing practice, procedure, and the conduct of all courts . .. if such
rules are consistent with the Constitution and neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify
the substantive rights of any litigant. . . ." PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(c).
18. The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure presently provide:
Rule 238. Award of Damages for Delay in an Action for Bodily Injury, Death or
Property Damage.
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (e), in an action seeking monetary
relief for bodily injury, death or property damage, or any combination
thereof, the court or the arbitrators appointed under the Arbitration Act of
June 16, 1936, P.L. 715, as amended 5 P.S. §30 et. seq., or the Health
Care Services Malpractice Act of October 15, 1975, P.L. 390, 40 P.S.
§1301.101 et. seq., shall
(1) add to the amount of compensatory damages in the award of the
arbitrators, in the verdict of a jury, or in the court's decision in a
nonjury trial, damages for delay at ten (10) percent per annum, not
compounded, which shall become part of the award, verdict, or deci-
sion;
(2) compute the damages for delay from the date the plaintiff filed
the initial complaint in the action or from a date one year after the
accrual of the cause of action, whichever is later, up to the date of
the award, verdict, or decision.
(b) In arbitration under the Act of 1836, the amount of damages for delay
shall not be included in determining whether the amount in controversy is
[Vol. 26:531
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November 20, 1978, effective April 15, 1979.19 The fundamental
purpose of this Rule was "to encourage pre-trial settlement....
Undeniably, the Rule serves to compensate the plaintiff for the
inability to utilize funds rightfully due him, but the basic aim of
the Rule is to alleviate delay in the disposition of cases, thereby
lessening congestion in the courts." ' 20 The question still facing us
today, however, is whether Rule 238 has fulfilled these goals. Very
recently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court answered this question
with an emphatic "no" when it directly overruled its prior decision
in Laudenberger v. Port Authority of Allegheny County21 by deem-
ing the Rule unconstitutional in Craig v. Magee Memorial Rehabil-
itation Center.22 This paper will argue that the only way in which
within the jurisdiction of the arbitrators.
(c) Except as provided in subdivision (e), damages for delay shall be added
to the award, verdict, or decision against all defendants found liable, no
matter when joined in the action.
(d) The court may, and on request of a party shall, charge the jury that if
it finds for the plaintiff, it shall not award the plaintiff any damages for
delay because this is a matter for the court.
(e) If a defendant at any time prior to trial makes a written offer of
settlement in a specified sum with prompt cash payment to the plaintiff,
and continues that offer in effect until commencement of trial, but the offer
is not accepted and the plaintiff does not recover by award, verdict, or
decision, exclusive of damages for delay, more than 125 percent of the offer,
the court or the arbitrators shall not award damages for delay for the period
after the date the offer was made.
(f) If an action is pending on the effective date of this rule, or if an action
is brought after the effective date on a cause of action which accrued prior
to the effective date, damages shall be computed from the date plaintiff
files the initial complaint or from a date one year after the accrual of the
cause of action, or from a date six (6) months after the effective date of
this rule, whichever date is later.
(g) This rule shall not apply to
(1) eminent domain proceedings;
(2) pending actions in which damages for delay are allowable in the
absence of this rule.
19. A dissent was filed by Justice Roberts. See 480 Pa. XLI (1978).
20. Laudenberger v. Port Authority of Allegheny County, 496 Pa. 52, 59,
436 A.2d 147, 151 (1981). See, e.g., Quach v. Filiaggi, 609 F. Supp. 847 (E.D.
Pa. 1985); Krupa by Krupa v. Williams, 316 Pa. Super. 408, 463 A.2d 429 (1983);
Renner v. Lichtenwalner, 513 F. Supp. 271 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
21. 496 Pa. 52, 436 A.2d 147 (1981).
22. 512 Pa. 60, 515 A.2d 1350 (1986). The author recognizes the fact that
on the surface the majority opinion in Craig did not declare Rule 238 to be
unconstitutional. However, certain language contained therein, specifically con-
cerning violations of due process and the Rule's "inequitable operation" (Craig,
512 Pa. at 63, 515 A.2d at 1353) leads to the conclusion that the Craig court was,
albeit indirectly, deeming certain portions of Rule 238 to be unconstitutional.
1988]
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Rule 238 will be able to achieve its original goal of promoting the
early settlement of cases23 is through a major revision of the Rule.
Specifically, the presently existing pre-judgment interest provision
must be amended and then combined with a type of "costs"
provision found in FED. R. Civ. P. 68,24 thereby leaving Pennsyl-
vania with a rule similar to the ones found in Michigan25 and
Wisconsin.
26
Whether or not the supreme court actually did find the Rule to be unconstitutional
is, however, basically irrelevant for purposes of this article, for the court em-
phatically announced a need for the Rule to be amended. This paper puts forth
one possible alternative for such an amendment of Rule 238.
23. Underlying this article is the assumption that increasing the number of
cases which are settled before going to trial is in the best interests of society as a
whole and should therefore be a high priority of the judicial system. Advocates
of this belief stress the tremendously overcrowded condition of our nations
courtrooms, and look to settlement as an efficient, cost-effective alternate means
of settling disputes. See, e.g., Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J.
274 (1982); Fleming, Court Survival in the Litigation Explosion, 54 JUDICATURE
109 (1970). Interestingly, in their article entitled "For Reconciliation", Professors
McThenia and Shaffer offer an unusual but interesting alternative rationale for
encouraging settlement. These authors add a religious dimension to the debate,
and appear to be moved by a conception of social organization that takes the
insular religious community as its model: "Justice is what we discover-you and
I, Socrates said-when we walk together, listen together, and even love one
another, in our curiosity about what justice is and where justice comes from."
McThenia and Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660, 1665 (1985). For
a scathing attack on this article, see Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 YALE L.J. 1669 (1985).
Other authors, however, disagree with this basic assumption and argue that
litigation is a far superior means of dispute resolution than is settlement. A well-
known adherent to this position is Professor Owen Fiss of Yale University, who
concludes in his recent article:
I do not believe that settlement as a generic practice is preferable to judgment
or should be institutionalized on a wholesale and indiscriminate basis. It
should be treated instead as a highly problematic technique for streamlining
dockets. Settlement is for me the civil analogue of plea bargaining: Consent
is often coerced; the bargain may be struck by someone without authority;
the absence of a trial and judgment renders subsequent judicial involvement
troublesome; and although dockets are trimmed, justice may not be done.
Like plea bargaining, settlement is a capitulation to the conditions of mass
society and should be neither encouraged nor praised. Fiss, Against Settle-
ment, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984).
Although I have a difficult time understanding, let alone concurring with, the
rationale provided by Professors McThenia and Shaffer, I do agree with the
commentators who view settlement as an effective and worthwhile means of dispute
resolution. Although Professor Fiss makes some thought-provoking arguments,
none of them can overcome the far too obvious need for a mechanism which will
impede the growth of the "litigation explosion". It is the opinion of the author
that settlement-despite its potential weaknesses-could be just the mechanism we
are searching for.
24. FED. R. Crv. P. 68.
25. In Michigan, these two provisions are found in two separate enactments
[Vol. 26:531
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II. BASIC OPERATION OF RULE 238
As noted earlier, the basic purpose behind Rule 238 is to en-
courage parties to settle their cases as early as possible in order to
avoid the costs, both to the court system and the parties themselves,
of litigation. 27 Rule 238 is based on the assumption that the over-
crowding problems which inevitably result when parties opt not to
settle can be solved by compelling the defendant, via "financial
incentives," 28 to seek settlement. Accordingly, in cases involving
bodily injury, death, or property damage, the Rule imposes delay
damages on defendants at ten (10) percent per annum, which run
either from the date on which the complaint is originally filed or
from a date one year after the accrual of the cause of action
(whichever is later). 29 Pursuant to section (e) of the Rule 3 0 a
defendant can avoid the imposition of delay damages only when
the following two requirements have been satisfied: (1) the defendant
has made a written offer of settlement (which is rejected by the
plaintiff); and (2) the judgment obtained by the plaintiff does not
exceed the offer of settlement by more than twenty-five (25%7o)
percent.31 Another interesting feature of this Rule is found in section
(c),32 which stipulates that all defendants, no matter when they are
joined in the action, face the same amount of delay damages unless
they can satisfy the two requirements of section (e). 33
but are used in conjunction with one another. The pre-judgment interest portion
is found in MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 600.6013 (1980), while the "costs"
provision, almost identical in format to FED. R. Civ. P. 68, is found in MICH R.
Civ. P. 519.
26. In Wisconsin, the two provisions are both located in Wis. STAT. §
807.01 (1979).
27. See supra note 20.
28. 1 Goodrich-Amram 2d § 238:1.
29. PA. R. Civ. P. 238(a)(2).
30. PA. R. CIv. P. 238(e).
31. For example, assume P (plaintiff) and D (defendant) are parties involved
in a lawsuit. D makes an offer of settlement to P in the amount of $10,000. P
rejects the offer, and the case proceeds to trial. The jury returns a verdict for P
in the amount of $15,000. Since the plaintiff's judgment does exceed the settlement
offer by more than twenty-five (25%o) percent, or $2,500, delay damages are
imposed on D pursuant to Rule 238. If, however, the same settlement offer was
made and rejected, yet this time plaintiff received a judgment for $12,000, no
delay damages would be imposed. Here, the judgement is only $2,000 more than
the settlement proposal, and therefore does not exceed the offer of settlement by
the requisite 25%.
32. PA. R. Civ. P. 238(c).
33. Several other states also have pre-judgment interest provisions similar
1988]
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III. LA UDENBERGER V. AUTHORITY OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY: THE
PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT'S FIRST EXAMINATION OF, RULE 238
In Laudenberger v. Port Authority of Allegheny County,34 the
plaintiff launched an attack on the constitutionality of PA. R. Civ.
P. 238, 31 arguing that it violated both the equal protection clause
3 6
and the requirements of substantive due process 7 under the Con-
stitution of both the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the United
States of America."' Concerning the equal protection clause, the
plaintiff argued that despite the fact that both parties to the lawsuit
were viewed as being "similarly circumstanced," Rule 238 treated
them differently, thereby violating the dictates of the Constitution.
39
Specifically, the plaintiff asserted that "the Rule does not provide
to the one found in PA. R. Civ. P. 238: Colorado: CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-21-
101 (1973); Louisiana: LSA-R.S. 13:4203 (1971); Michigan: MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 600.6013 (1980); New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 524:1-6 (Supp.
1969); North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-05 (1970); Ohio: Omo REV. CODE
ANN. § 1343:03 (Page 1979); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 727(1) (1965);
Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-21-10 (1976); South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 21-1-11 (1972); Wisconsin: WIs. STAT. § 807.01 (1979). A closer
examination of some of these statutes is undertaken by the author towards the
end of this paper.
34. 496 Pa. 52, 436 A.2d 147 (1981).
35. The plaintiff also argued that the Rule involved a substantive right and
was therefore beyond the procedural rule-making authority of Pennsylvania's
Supreme Court. The majority disagreed and concluded that the Rule involved
procedural questions and only had a collateral effect on the substantive rights of
the parties. Laudenberger, 496 Pa. at 66, 67, 436 A.2d at 155. As a result, the
court was not over-extending its authority upon its promulgation of Rule 238.
36. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; PA. CONST. art. III, § 32. The require-
ments of the equal protection clause dictate that:
A classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon
some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be
treated alike."
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971), quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia,
253 U.S. 412 (1920).
37. The constitutional standard of substantive due process dictates that:
A law which purports to be an exercise of the police power must not be
unreasonable, unduly oppressive or patently beyond the necessities of the
case, and the means which it employs must have a real and substantial
relation to the objects sought to be attained.
Gambone v. Commonwealth, 375 Pa. 547, 551, 101 A.2d 634, 637 (1954).
38. Laudenberger, 496 Pa. 52, 54, 436 A.2d 147, 149.
39. In Commonwealth v. Kramer, 474 Pa. 341, 378 A.2d 824 (1977), the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court reiterated the basic principle that the concept of




for delay damages to be awarded to the defendant if it is the
plaintiff who is delaying the action."' 4 The court rejected this
argument, and did so not by specifically addressing the question of
fault, 4' but by attacking the plaintiff's underlying assumption that
the plaintiffs and defendants are similarly situated for purposes of
Rule 23 8:
Rule 238 obviously creates distinctions between plaintiffs and defen-
dants. The difference upon which the classification rests is that the
plaintiffs have been wrongly injured and have suffered financial
losses because of the defendants' action. The losses then become
exacerbated by defendants' refusal to settle the lawsuit in a timely
fashion. The defendants, on the other hand, have suffered no
wrong .... It is in their best interest to protract the litigation process
as long as possible, so that they may benefit from the funds rightfully
owing to the plaintiffs.
42
In order to satisfy the requirement of the equal protection clause,
this distinction, incorporated into the "workings" of Rule 238,
must bear a "fair and substantial relation to its articulated goal-
the encouragement of defendants to settle meritorious claims as
soon as is reasonably possible." ' 43 According to the majority of the
court," the requirements are satisfied, for the imposition of delay
damages on the defendants' "encourages early activity . . . to
resolve legitimate claims in an expeditious fashion and deprives
them of the opportunity to benefit from needless delays and last-
minute settlements."
45
The plaintiff in Laudenberger also attacked Rule 238 on the
grounds that it violated his rights guaranteed by substantive due
process. Here again, plaintiff argued that Rule 238 was not ration-
ally related to a legitimate state goal, and further alleged that its
application worked to deny him of certain property rights." The
court quickly rejected this argument by reiterating its belief that
40. Laudenberger, 496 Pa. at 68, 436 A.2d at 156.
41. The question of fault raised by the plaintiff in Laudenberger is the
basis for the court's reversal of the Laudenberger decision five years later in
Craig. A detailed discussion of this case takes place later in the article.
42. Laudenberger, 496 Pa. at 68, 69, 436 A.2d at 156.
43. Id. at 69, 436 A.2d at 156.
44. Chief -Justice O'Brien wrote the majority opinion for the court. His
views were shared by the remainder of the court with the exception of Justice
Roberts, who filed a dissenting opinion.
45. Laudenberger, 496 Pa. at 69, 436 A.2d at 156.
46. Id. at 70, 436 A.2d at 157. See, e.g., Rogin v. Bensalem, 616 F.2d 380
(3d Cir. 1980) and cases cited therein.
1988]
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"the prejudgment interest rule serves the purpose for which it was
promulgated. ' 47 Accordingly, Chief Justice O'Brien concluded his
opinion by stating that "Rule 238 therefore must be viewed as
comporting with the constitutional requirements of both equal pro-
tection and substantive due process." ' 48 Concerning the ability of
the Rule to fulfill its original objectives, the court once again
wholeheartedly approved, and stated: "The delay in disposition of
cases emasculates the judicial system's ability to hear those cases
which must be litigated. Rule 238 fulfills this Court's obligation to
the legislature and to the public to effectuate prompt, expeditious
trial and settlement of cases." 49 Clearly, the majority opinion in
Laudenberger may be viewed as a glorification of PA. R. Civ. P.
238.
However, the dissenting opinion in Laudenberger, authored by
Justice Roberts,50 takes a very different position. Contrary to the
majority's conclusion concerning the ability of the Rule to fulfill
its legislative purpose, Robert's argues that "Rule 238 imposes
arbitrary, unreasonable, and unequal burdens in the absence of
tangible evidence that such measures will serve to accomplish the
Rule's intended purpose of eliminating delay."'" To support this
conclusion, Justice Roberts points out three ways in which the
defendant is unfairly treated by Rule 238.52 First, the Rule auto-
matically imposes liability without regard to the good or bad faith
of the defendant. For example, defendant A can make a good faith
settlement offer which would appear reasonable and still be sub-
jected to the imposition of delay damages if the judgment exceeds
the offer by twenty-six (2607o) percent. Conversely, defendant B,
who deliberately offers an unreasonably low sum in an effort to
force the plaintiff into litigation, will nevertheless be automatically
relieved of the penalty if the factfinder should enter an award which
47. Laudenberger, 496 Pa. at 70, 436 A.2d at 157.
48. Id. at 71, 436 A.2d at 157.
49. Id. at 61, 436 A.2d at 152.
50. It should be noted that besides dissenting from the majority opinion in
Laudenberger, Justice Roberts also dissented from the court's original promulga-
tion of Rule 238. See 480 Pa. XLI (1978).
. 51. Laudenberger, 496 Pa. at 77, 436 A.2d at 160 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
Justice Roberts also disagreed with the majority on the substantive/procedural
issue, concluding that Rule 238 involved only substantive issues and as such, was
solely within the "jurisdiction" of the legislature and not the judiciary.




falls a few dollars shy of exceeding the settlement offer by 25%."1
Second, Rule 238 can impose a penalty on the defendant even
where the settlement offer is within the requisite proximity to the
factfinder's award; as a result, even a defendant who fulfills the
requirements of section (e) cannot always protect himself from the
imposition of delay damages. Specifically, pursuant to section (a)(2),
interest is to be computed from either the date on which the
complaint is filed or one year after the cause of action has accrued ,
4
whichever is later. If the plaintiff files a complaint immediately
after the accrual of the cause of action, the defendant is given time
to evaluate the merits of the complaint and make a reasoned
settlement offer without having to worry about the imposition of
delay damages. However, where the plaintiff does not file his
complaint until more than one year after the cause of action has
occurred (which is often the case), the defendant is immediately
subjected to the interest penalty, and is left without any non-
penalized "free time" to make a reasoned evaluation of the plain-
tiff's claim. Thus, even if the judgment exceeds the defendant's
offer of settlement by less than 25%, he is still forced to incur
delay damages for the time he used to formulate his offer. To make
matters worse, this time (and accompanying penalty) will generally
not be insignificant, for in order to make an accurate settlement
offer, the defendant will, at a minimum, be forced to spend time
closely examining the complaint and undergoing some preliminary
discovery.
Finally, Justice Roberts' third argument is that "if the object of
the Rule is to discourage delay, the Rule should not only require
the defendant to make reasonable settlement offers, but also should
require the plaintiffs to make reasonable demands."" According to
the dissent, both the defendant and the plaintiff should be forced
53. The author recognizes the fact that in order to rectify this particular
form of unfairness, the court would be required to determine the motives behind
the settlement offers. Although this type of subjective decision making can be
problematic, it has been done successfully by courts in other situations. For
example, in contract disputes the court is often called upon to reach a result which
is "consistent with the intent of the parties at the time of contracting"; the court
can make this determination by referring not only to evidence on the record, but
to all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case. It is my contention
that the same type of analysis can be successfully applied in the context of Rule
238.
54. PA. R. CIrv. P. 238(a)(2).
55. Laudenberger, 496 Pa. at 78, 436 A.2d at 160 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
19881
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to incur similar sanctions when their respective unreasonable be-
havior precludes the settlement of their case.
IV. CRAIG v. MAGEE MEMORIAL REHABILITATION CENTER: THE
PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT REEXAMINES RULE 238
Approximately six years after deciding Laudenberger, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court was again faced with a constitutional chal-
lenge to Rule 238 in Craig v. Magee Memorial Rehabilitation
Center.56 As will be discussed in the following paragraphs, the court
opted to adhere to the conclusions of Justice Roberts' dissent in
Laudenberger and accordingly overruled the previous case.
5 7
An examination of the facts in Craig provides an excellent ex-
ample of how Rule 238 works in practice. In May of 1974, the
plaintiff, Mrs. Craig, was receiving medical treatment at the Magee
Memorial Rehabilitation Center. While in the hospital, Mrs. Craig
suffered injuries as a result of her coming into contact with an
airblower which was being utilized in the treatment of a decubitis
ulcer. Two years later, the plaintiff instituted a medical malpractice
action against the defendant hospital. As it turned out, however, it
was not until December of 1980, more than four years after the
cause of action had accrued, that the case came to trial. Even
worse, a mistrial occurred at that time, and it was not until three
years later-in January, 1983-that the case was tried to conclusion.
Importantly, the pre-trial record revealed that many lengthy post-
ponements, delays and requests for continuances could be attributed
to the plaintiff, Mrs. Craig. The record also indicated that the
defendant had made a $25,000 settlement offer which was quickly
rejected. The jury found for the plaintiff, and awarded Mrs. Craig
a judgment in the amount of $50,000. Since the jury's verdict
exceeded the defendant's settlement offer by more than twenty-five
(25%) percent, delay damages of $16,450 were imposed pursuant
to Rule 238. The Rehabilitation Center subsequently filed a post-
trial motion asserting the unconstitutionality of Rule 238. Both
lower courts dismissed the appellant's Rule 238 arguments, directly
relying on the supreme court's decision in Laudenberger as support.
56. 512 Pa. 60, 515 A.2d 1350 (1986).
57. Of the seven Supreme Court justices who took part in the Craig decision,
four (including Chief Justice Nix) followed the majority opinion written by Justice
McDermott, one justice concurred, while two others, Papadakos and Larsen,
joined in the dissent.
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur to reexamine
both its holding in Laudenberger as well as PA. R. CIV. P. 238.
Justice McDermott began the majority opinion by describing Rule
238 as a "bold experiment" which, at the time of its promulgation,
"seemed reasonable, salutory, and equitable." 8 Although the opin-
ion does not specifically label it as such, the Craig court infers that
this experiment can now be deemed a failure. The Craig opinion
discusses Laudenberger, and points out that the court's holding
there would only be equitable in the limited situation where the
defendant was the sole cause of the delay-exactly the scenario
found in Laudenberger19 The facts in Craig presented a completely
different situation, however, for Rule 238 was invoked here when
the plaintiff was single-handedly responsible for a large portion of
the delay. As a result, the Laudenberger holding was simply non-
applicable to Craig. Instead of directly attacking its previous deci-
sion in Laudenberger, the court instead chose the Rule itself as its
target, and concluded: "In short, Rule 238 has become an uncon-
testable presumption that all fault lies with the defendant. There
are too many reasons why such is not always the case; and what is
not always so may not be irrebuttable when a penalty follows."' 0
Importantly, the court went on to directly reject its Laudenberger
holding by suspending the Rule and concluding that it was simply
unable to achieve the goals which the legislature had originally
intended:
Having had now the opportunity for observation of the workings of
Rule 238, and being presented herein with a factual context which
frames in sharp relief the Rule's inequitable operation, we direct that
those mandatory provisions of Rule 238 which assess delay damages
against defendants without regard to fault are suspended as of this
date .... 61
In order to determine if indeed the defendant was at fault (and
thereby equitably trigger the imposition of Rule 238 delay damages),
the Craig majority went on to provide the Pennsylvania courts with
procedures for a post-judgement Fault Hearing.6 2 These directions,
58. Craig, 512 Pa. 60, 64, 515 A.2d 1350, 1352.
59. Id. at 64, 515 A.2d at 1353.
60. Id. at 65, 515 A.2d at 1353.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 65, 66, 515 A.2d at 1353.
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consistent with the practice in both Ohio 63 and South Dakota, 64 tell
the lower courts when the hearing will occur, which court shall
make the decision, and the factors which the decision-maker should
take into consideration when deciding which party was at fault for
the delay.
65
In summary, the Craig holding, while agreeing with Justice Rob-
erts' earlier dissent that Rule 238 is unconstitutional, limited its
rationale for this conclusion to the lack of a Fault Hearing and,
specifically, that under the present Rule a defendant can incur delay
damages even when the plaintiff alone is at fault. By limiting its
holding in this manner, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court missed an
excellent opportunity to bring out other equally fundamental prob-
lems associated with Rule 238. For example, besides the absolutely
correct recognition of the unfairness imposed upon the defendant
without the opportunity to have a Fault Hearing, the court seemingly
failed to recognize other critically important forms of unfairness
(some of which are discussed by Justice Roberts in his Laudenberger
dissent) which make the Rule even more unworkable and unconsti-
tutional. Moreover, the opinion did not even touch upon a basic
defect in the Rule and a major reason why it simply cannot, as it
nowzstands, fulfill its original objective of fostering early settlements
63. See Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1343-03(c) (Page 1979). In his Craig
dissent, Justice Larsen criticized the type of procedure provided by the majority
as "unnecessary," "burdensome," and contradictory to the original purpose of
the Rule in its creation of another step which a party must take in the litigation
process. Craig, 512 Pa. 60, 73, 515 A.2d 1350, 1357 (Larsen, J., dissenting). This
attack is unwarranted for several reasons. First, the costs incurred as a result of
the Fault Hearing are outweighed by the benefits, for not only will this additional
time be minimal, but it will also be extremely valuable in its elimination of the
fundamental inequity imposed on the defendant by present Rule 238. Moreover,
research into the Ohio statute which imposes very similar post-verdict fault hearing
procedures indicates little dissatisfaction on the part of the litigants. For example,
in two fairly recent Ohio cases, Caston v. Buckeye Insurance Co., No. 10-008,
slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. March 23, 1984) and Hicks v. Warren General Hospital,
No. 3345, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. May 4, 1984), the statute and its fault hearing
procedures were apparently applied without any problem.
64. See S.D. CODIIED LAWS ANN. § 21-1-11 (1972) and a case which
interpreted the relevant portions of this statute: Safeco Insurance Co. v. City of
Watertown, 538 F. Supp. 49 (D.S.D. 1982).
65. The Craig majority posited the following factors for courts to evaluate
when determining fault: (1) the length of time between the starting date and the
verdict; (2) the parties' respective responsibilities in requesting continuance; (3)
the parties' compliance with rules of discovery; (4) the respective responsibilities
for delay necessitated by the joinder of additional parties. Craig, 512 Pa. at 66,
515 A.2d at 1353.
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of cases. Specifically, while the Rule provides ample incentive for
the defendant/offeror to tender reasonable settlement offers, it
provides no real incentive for the plaintiff/offeree to act in a
"reasonable manner" and accept these offers. Only when both
parties are "encouraged" to act "reasonably" will the number of
settlements increase. The remainder of this article is dedicated to a
detailed analysis of these shortcomings in the Craig opinion, and
concludes with a proposal for a new Rule 238 which would incor-
porate the elements necessary to permit. the Rule to fulfill its original
expectations.
V. THE NECESSARY EXPANSION OF CRAIG V. MAGEE MEMORIAL
REHABILITATION CENTER
Although Justice Roberts' dissent in Laudenberger and the ma-
jority opinion in Craig bring out some of the ways in which the
operation of Rule 238 is unfair to defendants, there are several
other fundamental inequities that need to be addressed. For exam-
ple, the following excerpt from the dissenting opinion in Craig
unintentionally reveals three separate problems stemming from the
Rule:
A defendant can always protect himself from the assessment of pre-
judgment interest by extending a reasonable settlement offer in a
timely manner. Delays in a case coming to trial, such as those which
occurred in the instant case, are of no consequence to a defendant
who has made a reasonable settlement offer. It is only where a
defendant chooses to make an unreasonable settlement offer, or fails
to make any offer that he will be subject to the mandatory require-
ments of Rule 238. 66 (emphasis added)
First, as discussed earlier and contrary to the above conclusion
of Justice Larsen, even a defendant who makes a "reasonable
settlement offer" is not always able to totally protect himself from
the imposition of delay damages under present Rule 238.67 To the
contrary, a defendant who is unfortunate enough to have a plaintiff
that waits more than a year after the cause of action has accrued
to file his complaint inevitably incurs this prejudgment interest.
66. Craig, 512 Pa. 60, 70, 515 A.2d 1350, 1355 (Larsen, J., dissenting)
67. Justice Roberts, speaking in his dissenting opinion in Laudenberger,
briefly mentioned this form of unfairness to defendants, but did not, according
to the author, give it the full treatment that it warrants. See supra note 54 and
accompanying text.
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The term "reasonable settlement offer" reveals yet another fun-
damental inequity of Rule 238. When one reads the Rule for the
first time, a very legitimate question easily comes to mind: What
constitutes a "reasonable'settlement offer"? A literal reading of
the Rule indicates that a "reasonable" offer is one that is not more
that twenty-five (25%) percent below the judgment rendered to the
plaintiff. 68 Although this estimation may appear to be simple enough
for the defendant to make,69 it is, in reality, quite the opposite.
First, we must not lose sight of the fact that people, not machines,
are setting the amount of the verdict. As a result, it is difficult for
a defendant to predict what either twelve members of a jury, a
judge, or an arbitrator will decide when making this decision-
especially to the requisite degree of accuracy. This task is made
even more difficult by the fact that there is frequently no statutory
cap on damages, so a defendant usually has no maximum amount
with which to work. Clearly, the defendant has no easy task when
he attempts to satisfy the "reasonable settlement offer" requirement
of section (e) and extinguish the tolling of the pre-judgment interest.
Equally important, and something which neither Justice Roberts
nor the Craig majority considered, is the unfairness imposed by
Rule 238 on a defendant who quite simply does not want to make
a settlement offer due to his good faith belief that he is not liable.
Rule 238, as it presently stands, basically forces a defendant to
make a settlement offer even when he sincerely feels that he has a
good chance of winning the lawsuit. For if he opts not to make
the offer, and contrary to his belief loses the lawsuit, 70 he can face
a substantial penalty in delay damages imposed by the court under
Rule 238. The fear of this "additional" penalty could quite easily
68. PA. R. Crv. P. 238(e).
69. In his dissenting opinion in Craig, Justice Larsen not only incorrectly
makes light of the task which the defendant faces when required to make a
"reasonable settlement offer", but also personally fails to apply the proper
percentage:
What constitutes a reasonable settlement offer in any particular case is not
left to the subjective judgment of the defendant, the plaintiff or the court.
Rule 238 provides the objective criteria that an offer that is eighty (80%)
percent or more of an eventual verdict is reasonable and if it falls short of
eighty (80%) percent, it fails to meet the standard of reasonableness.
Craig, 512 Pa. 60, 70, 515 A.2d 1350, 1355 n.1 (Larsen, J., dissenting).
70. We are all aware of situations where despite the fact that a litigant has
the much stronger case, he still ends up losing the lawsuit. This is an unfortunate




convince a defendant to make a settlement offer when he really
does not want to do so.
Finally, there are three additional reasons why Rule 238 is unfair
to defendants. First, the Rule clearly dictates that defendants must
keep settlement offers open until the date on which the trial begins. 71
This requirement contradicts the basic purpose behind the Rule,
i.e., to.provide an incentive for the early settlement of cases. By
imposing a cut-off point for making these offers, and thus making
sure that they occur well in advance of trial, the Rule would give
the parties that necessary incentive to settle before the most intensive
preparation for trial has occurred. 72 Next, there is no real reason
why only defendants should be permitted to make settlement offers
under Rule 238 .7 It is not difficult to recognize that permitting
both parties in the lawsuit to initiate the settlement process can
only increase the number of cases which are settled before going to
trial. 74 Third, section (c)75 of the Rule is very unfair to a certain
type of defendant-a party who is forced to defend after the
proceedings begin. Under this section, these defendants suffer the
same pre-judgment interest penalty as all other defendants in the
lawsuit, no matter when they became a party. These particular
defendants were in no way at fault for delays which occurred prior
to their entrance into the suit; nevertheless, the Rule punishes them
just the same. This clear example of unfairness, just like the ones
provided by Justice Roberts in Laudenberger, the majority in Craig,
and in the preceding paragraphs, indicate the fundamentally defec-
tive nature of Rule 238.
71. PA. R. Civ. P. 238(e).
72. It is interesting to note that FED. R. Crv. P. 68, entitled "Offer of
Judgment", presently imposes the cut off date for settlement offers at ten days
before the trial commences. Both the 1983 and 1984 proposed amendments to this
Rule suggest that this time period should be extended even further from the date
of the trial. See Simon, The Riddle of Rule 68, 54 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1986).
73. Section (e) of the Rule begins: "If the defendant at anytime prior to
trial makes an offer of settlement ... " Clearly, no mention is made of plaintiff
initiating the settlement process.
74. Although in the present form FED. R. Clv. P. 68 only permits a
defendant to make settlement offers, both the 1983 and 1984 proposed amendments
suggest that the plaintiff should also be given this opportunity. See supra note
72. Moreover, it should be pointed out that the analogous Wisconsin statute,
which will be discussed in some detail later in the article, permits either the
plaintiff or the defendant to make settlement offers. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 807.01
(West 1979).
75. For an examination of this particular section of the Rule, see supra
note 18.
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As mentioned earlier, Rule 238 suffers from another equally severe
flaw.7 6 Specifically, while it is clear that the Rule provides the
defendant/offeror with an incentive to make a "reasonable settle-
ment offer," ' 77 it simply does not provide an incentive for the
plaintiff/offeree to act in a "reasonable" manner by accepting
"reasonable" settlement offers.78 In fact, a close examination of
the Rule reveals that a plaintiff who acts in an unreasonable, or
even "bad faith" manner, will not suffer any adverse consequences
under Rule 238. This fact is of critical importance, for only when
both parties to the lawsuit are "encouraged" to act in a "reason-
able" manner will the ultimate goal of increasing the number of
settlements become a reality. It is clear, then, that there is a
tremendously important "gap" left in PA. R. Cirv. P. 238 which
must be filled before the Rule can achieve its purpose. The big
question remains: What can the Rules Committee use to fill this
void?
VI. FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 68: THE "GAP FILLER"
The answer to this critical question can be found in FED. R. Civ.
P. 68. 79 This rule, entitled "Offer of Judgment," dictates that a
76. This critical flaw was only briefly mentioned by Justice Roberts in his
Laudenberger dissent, see supra note 38 and accompanying text. More importantly,
the defect was not even discussed by the majority in Craig.
77. Quite obviously, if the defendant makes a settlement offer which is
rejected and turns out to be within twenty-five (250) of the judgment, he is
"rewarded" by not having to pay delay damages to the plaintiff.
78. Clearly, every recipient of a settlement offer has a basic incentive to
act in a "reasonable" manner and accept a "fair" offer-the opportunity to
obtain compensation from the opponent without taking the inevitable risk of going
to trial. This incentive, however, exists whether or not Rule 238 is applicable.
This fact, along with its minimal impact on offerees (plaintiffs normally only
bring lawsuits when they feel that they have a relatively good chance of winning
at trial) renders this incentive irrelevant in our analysis.
79. FIED. R. CIrv. P. 68 provides:
Offer of Judgment
At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party defending
against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment
to be taken against him for the money or property or to the effect specified
in his offer, with costs then accrued. If within 10 days after the service of
the offer the adverse party serves written notice that the offer is accepted,
either party may then file the offer and notice of acceptance together with
proof of service thereof and thereupon the clerk shall enter judgment. An
offer not accepted shall be deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof is not
admissible except in a proceeding to determine costs. If the judgment finally
obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree
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defendant may offer, any time up to ten days before trial, to allow
judgment to be taken against him on specified terms.8 0 Subsequently,
the plaintiff has ten days to accept or reject the offer. If, on the
one hand, the plaintiff decides to accept the defendant's offer,
either party may file the offer with the court, and the clerk will
enter judgment accordingly. However, if the plaintiff decides to
reject the offer and ultimately obtains a judgment that is less
favorable than the rejected offer, the plaintiff "must pay the cost
incurred8 after the making of the offer." In the words of one
commentator: 82 "Rule 68 is designed to encourage settlement and
avoid protracted litigation by forcing a prevailing plaintiff to pay
any costs that accrue (to the defendant) after the plaintiff rejects a
settlement offer more favorable than the plaintiff's judgment at
trial." 83
must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer. The fact that an
offer is made but not accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer. When
the liability of one party to another has been determined by verdict or order
or judgment, but the amount or extent of the liability remains to be
determined by further proceedings, the party adjudged liable may make an
offer of judgment, which shall have the same effect as an offer made before
trial if it is served within a reasonable time not less than 10 days prior to
the commencement of hearings to determine the amount or extent of liability.
80. Pursuant to the Rule, the offer may be for money, property, or other
terms specified in the offer, with costs accrued to the date of the offer.
81. A large portion of the controversy surrounding FED. R. CIv. P. 68 has
involved the question of what constitutes the "costs incurred" by a party who
has made a settlement offer that is later rejected by his opponent. Specifically,
the debate has centered on whether attorney fees should be included in this
computation. Although very interesting, this topic is extremely complex and is
beyond the scope of this paper. For recent judicial discussion on this topic, see
Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1 (1985); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983);
Christianburg Garment Co. v. E.E.O.C., 434 U.S. 412 (1978). For recent law
review commentaries on this same subject, see Note, The Proposed Amendments
to Federal Rule of Procedure 68: Toughening the Sanctions, 70 IOWA L. REv. 237
(1954); Simon, The Riddle of Rule 68, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1986).
82. Simon, The Riddle of Rule 68, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 3 (1986).
83. It should be pointed out that although this discussion is basically beyond
the scope of this article, FED. R. CIv. P. 68, like PA. R. Cirv. P. 238, has been
criticized for not being able to fulfill its legislative purpose of encouraging
settlement. According to Professor Simon, two principle defects account for this
alleged failure. First, like its Pennsylvania counterpart, Rule 68 only permits
defendants to make settlement offers. Second, the sanction of post offer "costs"
is usually too small to motivate parties to settle. As a result of these problems,
in 1983 the Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure put forth
a proposed amendment to overhaul Rule 68. Because intense controversy sur-
rounded the requested changes, the Committee was forced to withdraw the 1983
proposal and seek a better solution. In the fall of 1984, the Committee proposed
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For the purposes of this paper, the critical section of Rule 68 is
the so-called "costs" provision, which basically forces the plaintiff
to pay the defendant's costs which were incurred after the plaintiff
had rejected a "reasonable '8 4 settlement offer. This portion of the
Rule clearly provides an incentive for the plaintiff to act in a
"reasonable" manner and accept settlement offers which appear to
be "reasonable" -exactly what is missing in PA. R. Civ. P. 238.85
Accordingly, the author proposes that only by adding a type of
"costs" provision found in FED. R. Crv. P. 68 to an amended
version of the delay damages provision already found in the Penn-
sylvania Rule will Rule 238 be able to fulfill its original purpose of
fostering the early settlement of cases and thereby alleviating the
congestion existing in the courtrooms of this Commonwealth.
It should first be pointed out that such a step would not be so
unusual for the Civil Procedure Rules Committee in Pennsylvania,
for at least two other rules of procedure contain this type of "costs"
provision.8 6 Rule 217, entitled "Costs of Continuance," states in
pertinent part:
When a continuance is granted upon application made subsequent to
the preliminary call of the trial list, the court may impose on the
its second effort to revamp Rule 68. This proposal, like the one a year earlier,
was vigorously attacked. According to Judge Weis of the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals, the Chairman of the Advisory Committee, the proposed changes will not
come up for a vote for quite some time, for the 1984 version is now being
examined by a House Sub-Committee which has yet to render a recommendation.
For a more complete discussion of the 1983 and 1984 proposed amendments, see
Simon, supra note 82.
84. Although no numerical value for a "reasonable" settlement offer is
imposed in Rule 68 (as it is in PA. R. Crv. P. 238), the Rule forces the plaintiff
to bear his opponent's financial burden any time the offer of settlement exceeds
the plaintiff's judgment at trial.
85. An argument can be made that Federal Rule 68 unfairly "pushes"
plaintiffs who really do not want to settle their cases toward settlement in much
the same Way that Pennsylvania Rule 238 does to defendants. Although this
argument has some merit, it suffers from a fatal flaw. Specifically, as noted in a
preceding footnote, there is presently a great deal of debate concerning whether
the defendant's attorney fees should be incorporated into the "costs" incurred by
a plaintiff under Rule 68. See supra note 81. As it now stands, however, these
fees are not to be included in this calculation. Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1
(1985). As a result, it is probably safe to say that at least in general, "costs"
which can be borne by a plaintiff under the federal rule are less expensive than
the pre-judgment interest which a Pennsylvania defendant may be forced to incur
under Rule 238. As a result, Rule 68 imposes a much weaker "push" to settle
than does Rule 238, and will therefore have a relatively slight impact on a plaintiff
who has a good faith belief that he will win the lawsuit.




party making the application the reasonable costs actually incurred
by the opposing party which would not have been incurred if the
application had been made at or prior to such preliminary call.1
7
Similarly, Rule 4019, generally entitled "Sanctions," imposes pen-
alties on parties who have in some way failed to conform to
"standard operating procedure" or court rules and in so doing have
retarded the litigation process. For example, section (d) dictates:
If at the trial or hearing, a party who has requested admissions as
authorized by Rule 4014 proves the matter which the other party has
failed to admit as requested, the court on motion may enter an order
taxing as costs against the other party the reasonable expenses in-
curred in making such proof."8
Importantly, both of these rules, like Federal Rule 68, provide a
definite incentive to act in a manner which the court deems to be
"reasonable" and which expedites the litigation process. s9 This same
type of incentive can easily be incorporated into Rule 238.
VII. MICHIGAN AND WISCONSIN: Two STATES WHICH HAVE
COMBINED THESE Two PROVISIONS
At least two other states, Michigan and Wisconsin, have done
exactly what the author proposes Pennsylvania should do, i.e.,
combine a "delay damages" provision with a "costs" provision in
the context of a rule concerning settlement offers to achieve the
87. PA. R. Cirv. P. 217. The remaining two paragraphs of the Rule are as
follows:
Where a continuance has been so granted and costs imposed, the party
upon whom such costs have been imposed may not, so long as such costs
remain unpaid, take any further step in such suit without prior leave of
court.
If the party upon whom such costs are so imposed was at fault in
delaying the application for continuance he may not recover such costs, if
ultimately successful in the action; otherwise such costs shall follow the
judgment in the action.
88. PA. R. Cirv. P. 4019(d).
89. It is interesting to note that both Rule 217 and Rule 4019, unlike Rule
238, contain a fault provision. Toward this end, under the former two Rules a
party must incur these costs only if he was responsible for the "unreasonable"
conduct. For Rule 217, see supra note 87. For Rule 4019, the following portion
of the Rule is explanatory:
($)(1) Except as otherwise provided in these rules, ... the court ... may
... require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motions
or the party or attorney advising such conduct or both of them to pay the
moving party the reasonable expenses ... incurred in obtaining the order
of compliance and the order for sanctions ....
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desired result of an increased number of settlements. Michigan does
this in two different, yet connected, enactments. First, in section
660.6013,90 entitled "Same; Interest on Judgment, Rate, Settle-
ment," the court is permitted to impose pre-judgment interest on
a party which is responsible for delay. Like its Pennsylvania coun-
terpart, however, the statute has an "escape hatch":
If a bona fide written offer of settlement in a civil action based on
tort is made by the party against whom the judgment is subsequently
rendered and the offer of settlement is substantially identical or
substantially more favorable to the prevailing party than the judg-
ment, the court may order that interest shall not be allowed beyond
the date the written offer of settlement is made. 91
90. 600.6013. Same; interest on judgment, rate, settlement
(1) Interest shall be allowed on a money judgment recovered in a civil
action, as provided in this section.
(2) For complaints filed before June 1, 1980, in an action involving
other than a written instrument having a rate of interest exceeding 607o per
year, the interest on the judgment shall be calculated from the date of filing
the complaint to June 1, 1980 at the rate of 6% per year and on and after
June 1, 1980 to the date of satisfaction of the judgment at the rate of 12%0
per year compounded annually.
(3) For complaints filed before June 1, 1980, in an action involving a
written instrument having a rate of interest exceeding 607o per year, the
interest on the judgment shall be calculated from the date of filing the
complaint to the date of satisfaction of the judgment at the rate specified
in the instrument if the rate was legal at the time the instrument was
executed. However, the rate after the date judgment is entered shall not
exceed the following:
(a) Seven percent per year compounded annually for any period of time
between the date judgment is entered and the date of satisfaction of the
judgment which elapses before June 1, 1980.
(b) Thirteen percent per year compounded annually for any period of
time between the date judgment is entered and the date of satisfaction of
the judgment which elapses after May 31, 1980.
(4) For complaints filed on or after June 1, 1980, interest shall be
calculated from the date of filing the complaint to the date of satisfaction
of the judgment at the rate of 12% per year compounded annually unless
the judgment is rendered on a written instrument having a higher rate of
interest. In that case interest shall be calculated at the rate specified in the
instrument if the rate was legal at the time the instrument was executed.
The rate shall not exceed 130%o per year compounded annually after the date
judgment is entered.
(5) If a bona fide written offer of settlement in a civil action based on
tort is made by the party against whom the judgment is subsequently rendered
and the offer of settlement is substantially identical or substantially more
favorable to the prevailing party than the judgment, the court may order
that interest shall not be allowed beyond the date the written offer of
settlement is made.
91. MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 600.6013 (1980).
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The legislative intent behind this section is also analogous to Penn-
sylvania Rule 238: "The provision in the statute relating to cases
in which bona fide offers of settlement have been made indicates
the public policy for settlement of tort claims."
'92
Rule 519, 93 entitled "Offer of Judgment: Offer of Damages at
Specified Sum," is a Michigan Rule of Civil Procedure which goes
hand-in-hand with section 600.6013. Of particular import to this
discussion is the penultimate sentence in the first paragraph of the
Rule which is identical to the "costs" provision found in FED. R.
Civ. P. 68: "If the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not
more favorable than the rejected offer, the offeree must pay the
taxable costs incurred after the making of the offer." ' 94 The moti-
vation behind this particular Rule also sounds very familiar: "The
purpose of Rule 519.1 was to encourage settlements and avoid
protracted litigation. . . . ',95 When these two enactments are used
in conjunction with one another both the Michigan plaintiff and
defendant are given a strong (monetary) incentive to settle the case
as early as possible. As a result, the identical legislative intent
behind both section 600.6013 and Rule 519 can be accomplished.
Interestingly, unlike its bordering state of Michigan, Wisconsin
combines both the delay damages provision and the costs provision
92. Davis v. Howard, 14 Mich. App. 342, 344, 165 N.W.2d 505, 507 (1968).
93. MicH. R. CIv. P. 519.1. The Rule, in pertinent part, is as follows:
Rule 519 Offer of judgment: Offer of Damages at Specified Sum.
1. Offer of Judgment. A party defending against a claim may serve upon
the adverse party an offer, in writing, to allow judgment to be taken against
him for all or a part of the claim for relief in accordance with the term of
the offer together with costs then accrued. If the adverse party serves written
notice that the offer is accepted, within 10 days after the service of the offer
and before the evidence is closed, either party may then file the offer and
notice of acceptance together with proof of service thereof and thereupon
the clerk shall enter judgment. An offer which is received 10 days before
the evidence is closed and is not accepted within 10 days after being received
shall be considered rejected. An offer received less than 10 days before the
evidence is closed may be accepted or expressly rejected before the evidence
is closed but if it is not thus expressly accepted or rejected the offer shall
not be considered as rejected and shall have no effect on costs. Evidence of
an offer is not admissible except in a proceeding to determine costs. If the
judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the
rejected offer, the offeree must pay the taxable costs incurred after the
making of the offer. The fact that an offer is made but not accepted does
not preclude a subsequent offer.
94. MicH. R. Civ. P. 519.1(1).
95. Bertilacci v. Avery, 42 Mich. App. 483, 485, 202 N.W.2d 331, 333
(1972).
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in the same statute to meet the desired goal of increasing the number
of settled cases. Section 807.01 , 96 entitled "Settlement Offers,"
contains four separate paragraphs. The first three are very similar
to FED. R. Civ. P. 68, and specifically have an analogous "cost"
provision: "If the offer of judgment is not accepted and the plaintiff
fails to recover a more favorable judgment, the plaintiff shall not
recover costs but defendant shall recover costs to be computed on
the demand of the complaint. ' 97 The fourth paragraph of the
96. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 807.01 (1979). The present form of the statute is as
follows:
(1) After issue is joined but at least 20 days before the trial, the defendant
may serve upon the plaintiff a written offer to allow judgment to be taken
against the defendant for the sum, or property, or to the effect therein
specified, with costs. If the plaintiff accepts the offer and serves notice
thereof in writing, before trial and within 10 days after receipt of the offer,
the plaintiff may file the offer, with proof of service of the notice of
acceptance, and the clerk must thereupon enter judgment accordingly. If
notice of acceptance is not given, the offer cannot be given as evidence nor
mentioned on the trial. If the offer of judgment is not accepted and the
plaintiff fails to recover a more favorable judgment, the plaintiff shall not
recover costs but defendant shall recover costs to be computed on the
demand of the complaint.
(2) After issue is joined but at least 20 days before trial, the defendant may
serve upon the plaintiff a written offer that if the defendant fails in the
defense the damages be assessed at a specified sum. If the plaintiff accepts
the offer and serves notice thereof in writing before trial and within 10 days
after receipt of the offer, and prevails upon the trial, either party may file
proof of service of the offer and acceptance and the damages will be assessed
accordingly. If the notice of acceptance is not given, the offer cannot be
given as evidence nor mentioned on the trial. If the offer is not accepted
and if damages assessed in favor of the plaintiff do not exceed the damages
offered, neither party shall recover costs.
(3) After issue is joined but at least 20 days before trial, the plaintiff may
serve upon the defendant a written offer of settlement for the sum, or
property, or to the effect therein specified, with costs. If the defendant
accepts the offer and serves notice thereof in writing, before the trial and
within 10 days after receipt of the offer, the defendant may file the offer,
with proof of service of the notice of acceptance, with the clerk of court.
If the notice of acceptance is not given, the offer cannot be given as evidence
nor mentioned on the trial. If the offer of settlement is not accepted and
the plaintiff recovers a more favorable judgment, the plaintiff shall recover
double the amount of the taxable costs.
(4) If there is an offer of settlement . . . by a party under this section which
is not accepted and the party recovers a judgment which is greater than or
equal to the amount specified in the offer of settlement, the party is entitled
to interest . . . at the annual rate of 120o on the amount recovered from
the date of the offer of settlement until the amount is paid. Interest under
this section is in lieu of interest computed under §§ 814.04(4) and 815.05
(8).
97. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 807.01(1) (1979).
[Vol. 26:531
RULE 238
statute, which was added through an amendment in 1979,98 is very
similar to PA. R. Civ. P. 238 in its providing the offeror with an
incentive to settle cases via the imposition of pre-judgment interest:
If there is an offer of settlement by a party under this section which
is not accepted and the party recovers a judgment which is greater
than or equal to the amount specified in the offer of settlement, the
party is entitled to interest at the annual rate of twelve (12) percent
on the amount recovered from the date of the offer of settlement
until the amount is paid. 99
The legislative intent behind section 807.01 is identical to that behind
the Federal Rule, the Pennsylvania Rule and the analogous Michigan
statutes: "The purpose of the statute regarding settlement offers is
to encourage settlement of cases prior to trial."' 1 As with Michigan,
the Wisconsin statute can fulfill this objective due to the fact that
the combination of the costs provision with the delay damages gives
both parties to the lawsuit a strong incentive to settle.
VIII. THE AUTHOR'S PROPOSED SOLUTION
As this article has discussed, the Pennsylvania Advisory Com-
mittee on the Rules of Civil Procedure needs to overhaul Rule 238
by amending the already existing "delay damages" provision and
combining it with a "costs" provision similar to the one in FED.
R. Civ. P. 68. In so doing, Pennsylvania would join its sister states
of Michigan and Wisconsin in having a rule involving settlement
offers which can fulfill the legislative purpose of increasing the
number of settled cases and alleviating the overcrowded condition
of this Commonwealth's courtrooms. Although this article will not
put forth a specific proposal for Rule 238, it does posit the following
suggestions which should be adopted by the Rules Committee when
it performs this function. I10
98. An examination of the legislative history behind this statute reveals that
it was originally promulgated in 1953, and was largely based on FED. R. CIv. P.
68. The fourth paragraph, which is not at all similar to this Federal Rule, was
added to § 807.01 in 1979, and has been amended in 1981 and again in 1983 to
arrive at its present form.
99. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 807.01 (4) (1979).
100. DeMars v. LaPour, 123 Wis. 2d 366, 367, 366 N.W.2d 891, 892 (1985).
101. As a result of Craig v. Magee Memorial Rehabilitation Center, 512 Pa.
60, 515 A.2d 1350 (1986), it seems quite certain that in the near future the Rules
Committee will amend Rule 238. At the close of its opinion, the majority strongly
hinted that such is the case: "Our directive in this matter is to remain in effect
until a new Rule on delay damages can be promulgated. The issue will be
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First, as to the delay damages portion of the new Rule, the
Committee can start with the present format of Rule 238 and make
amendments which are necessary to eliminate or at least alleviate
some of the previously discussed unfairness it imposes on defen-
dants. For example, in order to ensure that only a party who causes
delay is forced to incur delay damages, the Committee should accept
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's "suggestion ' 10 2 (and also follow
the practice of the State of Ohio) 10 3 and incorporate a post-judgment
Fault Hearing into the Rule. l0 The Committee should then proceed
to amend section (c) of the Rule to ensure that joined defendants,
like all other defendants, are permitted to take advantage of the
Fault Hearing procedure. Also, in keeping with the ultimate goal
of increasing the number of settlements, section (e) of the new Rule
should permit either the plaintiff or the defendant to initiate the
process by serving settlement offers upon his opponent. 05 Impor-
tantly, the author does not contend that these proposed changes
will eliminate all of the ways in which the present Rule is unfair to
defendant/offerees. These parties will, however, be placed in a
better position not only by these amendments, but by their knowl-
edge that now at least their opponents will also face the threat of
sanctions as a result of the "cost" provision of the new Rule.
Concerning this provision of the proposed Rule, the Committee
will not have the luxury of merely amending an already existing
immediately brought to the attention of the Civil Procedure Rules Committee for
their consideration." Craig, 512 Pa. at 64, 515 A.2d at 1353. Accordingly, in
January of 1988 the Committee published a proposed version of an amended PA.
R. Civ. P. 238 for purposes of public comment and discussion. The Committee
will accept comments on this proposal through the end of May, 1988. Based on
these comments and its own revisions, the Civil Procedure Rules Committee will
submit its final proposal for an. amended Rule 238 to the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania for its ultimate consideration.
102. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
103. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1343.03 (Page 1979). The relevant portion of
the statute is as follows:
(C) Interest on a judgment, decree, or order for the payment of money
rendered in a civil action based on tortious conduct and not settled by
agreement of the parties, shall be computed from the date the cause of
action accrued to the date on which the money is paid, if, upon motion of
any party to the action, the court determines at a hearing held subsequent
to the verdict or decision in the action that the party required to pay the
money failed to make a good faith effort to settle the case and that the
party to whom the money is paid did not fail to make a good faith effort
to settle the case.
104. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
105. In so doing, Pennsylvania would follow both Ohio (see supra note 103)
and Wisconsin (see supra note 96).
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Pennsylvania rule. It will, however, have many resources from which
it can come up with this portion of Rule 238. The place to start is,
of course, Federal Rule 68. As this paper has discussed, the Rule
has undergone tremendous criticism, and currently faces a proposed
amendment. 106 One answer, then, would be for the Rules Committee
in Pennsylvania simply to inject the present form of Federal Rule
68 into the Pennsylvania Rule, and incorporate the amendments
when, and if, the Federal Rules Committee adopts them. A better
solution, however, would be for the Pennsylvania Committee to
examine the proposed amendments (as well as commentaries which
discuss them) 10 7 for itself and use these resources to come up with
its own "costs" provision. The state legislature in Wisconsin opted
to do just this in section 807.01,101 for this statute incorporates two
of the changes to Federal Rule 68 recommended in the 1984 pro-
posed amendment: (1) both the plaintiff and the defendant can
make settlement offers;10 9 and (2) settlement offers can only be
extended up to twenty (20) days before the trial begins.110 Pennsyl-
vania should make these same changes, for they would not only
help to lessen the unfairness of Rule 238, but would simultaneously
assist in fulfilling the ultimate goal of increasing the number of
cases which are settled before proceeding to trial.
106. See supra note 83.
107. Id.
108. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 807.01 (1979).
109. See supra note 74.
110. See supra note 72.
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